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Lending into Arrears-A Policy Adrift
LEE C. BUCHHEIT*AND ROSA M. LASTRA**
In 1970, the International Monetary Fund articulated a policy dealing with the circum-
stances under which the Fund will extend financial assistance to a member country that at the
time has payment arrears to its other creditors. This article reviews the history of this "lend-
ing into arrears" policy and its adaptation over the years to the changing nature of sovereign
borrowing and debt management practices. The article agues that the LIA polity, as it is
being implemented in 2007, has slipped its original philosophical moorings and may eventu-
ally draw the IMF Executive Board into playing a referee function in future sovereign debt
workouts.
I. Introduction
The International Monetary Fund's ("IMF" or the "Fund") lending into arrears policy
("LIA"),' as it is being implemented in 2007 (some eighteen years after its debut), may be
a perfectly sensible measure to protect the IMF's own lending into a distressed situation.
Or it may be a pretext for the IMF to assert a degree of supervision over the methods by
which sovereign debtors reach settlements with their private sector creditors. Or it may
be both. Therein rests the problem. No one, the IMF least of all, seems prepared to
articulate the definitive rationale and objective of the LIA policy. This makes a critical
analysis of the policy, whether attempted by the IMF Executive Board, sovereign debtors,
or private lenders, very difficult. This article has three objectives: (1) to trace the evolu-
tion of LIA since its inauguration in 1989 in light of the historical events that have shaped
its adaptation (if one views LIA in a benignant light) or its corruption (if one does not)
since 1989; (2) to analyze the competing rationales for the policy; and (3) to offer some
thoughts on how to promote the virtue of candor in the LIA debate, even if the virtue of
wisdom remains elusive.
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1. "Lending into arrears" describes the circumstances in which the IMF will be prepared to extend finan-
cial assistance to a member country that has accumulated overdue amounts to other creditors.
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H. Evolution of a Policy
The IMF's policy regarding sovereign arrears to private creditors has ebbed and flowed
in response to the significant changes in the international capital markets over the last few
decades. In this section of the paper, we trace this evolution and consider the legal basis of
the policy.
A. THE 1970 FORMULATION
The IMF's arrears policy was first articulated in a decision adopted by the IMF's Execu-
tive Board in 1970.2 The policy was generally intolerant of arrears, ostensibly because
2. Decision No. 3153-(70-95), adopted 26 October, 1970, available in Selected Decisions, Seventeenth Issue,
International Monetary Fund, Washington DC, 1992, pp. 359-36. See also http://www.imf.org/externa/
pubs/ft/sd/index.asp?decision=3153-(70/95)-2 and http://wvw.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/sd/index.asp?deci-
sion=3153-(70/95).
Decision No. 3153-(70/95) (emphasis added) reads as follows:
1. Undue delays in the availability or use of exchange for current international transactions that result
from a governmental limitation give rise to payments arrears and are payments restrictions under
Article VIII, Section 2 (a), and Article XIV, Section 2. The limitation nay be formalized, as for
instance compulsory waiting periods for exchange, or informal or ad hoc.
2. The need for the Fund to define its policy on payments arrears is emphasized by the fact that restric-
tions resulting in payments arrears arising from informal or ad hoc measures do particular harm to a
country's international financial relationships because of the uncertainty they generate. This uncer-
tainty is particularly harmful to the smooth functioning of the international payments system and has
pronounced adverse effects on the creditworthiness of the debtor country which may extend beyond
the period of the existence of the restrictions.
3. In the light of these considerations, it is believed that the Fund should aim in consultation reports at
a more systematic treatment of restrictions on payments and transfers for current international
transactions that produce payments arrears. In all cases where payments arrears arise from a govern-
mental limitation on, or interference with, the availability of foreign exchange at the time a payment
for a current international transaction falls due, or with the timely transfer of the proceeds of such
transactions, the payments arrears should be treated in the consultation papers as evidence of a
payments restriction requiring approval in Article VIII or Article XIV consultation decisions. The
staff, in the consultation discussions, will have to establish whether payments arrears exist by ascer-
taining whether there has been a substantial delay beyond that usually required for ascertaining the
bona fides of exchange applications or the time that can be regarded as normally required for the
administrative processing of applications for exchange. If payments arrears exist and approval of the
restriction giving rise to them is requested by the member, the member should be expected to sub-
mit a satisfactory program for their elimination. Approval if given should be only for a temporary
period and generally with a fixed terminal date. Because of the difficulty in surveillance, approval
should be wherever feasible in terms of the level of arrears outstanding. The program for the elimi-
nation of the payments arrears should provide for a maximum permissible delay to which a payment
or transfer could be subjected, together with a phased reduction in the outstanding level.
4. Fund financial assistance to members having payments arrears should be granted on the basis of
performance criteria or policies with respect to the treatment of arrears similar to the criteria or
policies described in the preceding paragraph for the approval of the payments restrictions. In gen-
eral, the understandings should provide for the elimination of the payments arrears within the period of the
stand-by arrangement. Such understandings should be based on the concept of a given level of pay-
ments arrears and should be reflected in the performance criteria included in stand-by arrangements
in the higher credit tranches. To support the policies designed to deal with arrears the letter of
intent should include a statement that there would be no imposition of new restrictions or increase
in the level of delayed payments. Where Fund financial assistance is being provided, but only
through the first credit tranche, the adoption of a viable program directed toward the elimination of
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they damage the member country's international financial relationships and perceived
creditworthiness. The principal focus of the 1970 decision, however, was on arrears that
accumulate as a consequence of foreign exchange restrictions imposed by the member
country, not arrears caused by outright defaults by the member on its debts owed to pri-
vate or bilateral creditors.
The 1970 decision of the IMF Board enjoined the IMF staff to scold member countries
during their annual Article IV consultations if those countries had allowed arrears to accu-
mulate. The decision also warned that a member country burdened by arrears that sought
financial assistance from the IMF would be expected to eliminate those arrears within the
period of the stand-by arrangement and to foreswear accumulating any new arrears in the
future. Thus, the IMF's policy at this stage did contemplate lending into arrears, as long
as the member committed to eliminate those arrears by a "fixed terminal date".
The principal legal basis of this 1970 decision is found in Article V Section 3(a) of the
IMF's Articles of Agreement, which requires the IMF to establish "adequate safeguards"
for the use of its resources to support effective balance of payments adjustment, and Arti-
cles VIII and XIV, relating to payment restrictions imposed by IMF members. LMF lend-
ing to a member country with arrears was considered inconsistent with the "adequate
safeguards" required by the IMF's Articles, particularly when the arrears were accumu-
lated to finance an ill-advised exchange rate policy. Indeed, the origins of the no-arrears
policy can be traced back further. The disruptive balance of payment practices by some
countries in the inter-war period led the drafters of the IMF Articles of Agreement to state
that one of the purposes of the institution, as defined in Article I(v), is:
To give confidence to members by making the general resources of the Fund tempo-
rarily available to them under adequate safeguards, thus providing them with the op-
portunity to correct maladjustments in their balance of payments without resorting to
measures destructive of national or international prosperity.3
B. THE 1980 FORMULATION
In 1980, the IMF's Board signaled that it was prepared to show even greater tolerance
toward arrears in the context of IMF-supported stabilization programs.4 The 1980 Board
decision reads, in pertinent part, as follows:
It might not be feasible in the early stages of the program to go beyond an under-
standing that the member would try to avoid any further increase in outstanding
arrears .... The Fund's policies on payments arrears are also concerned with their
treatment in the context of stabilization programs supported by use of the Fund's
resources. In these programs, member countries are expected to take steps to reduce
and eventually eliminate payments arrears relating to capital transactions as well as to
payments and transfers for current international transactions. In formulating policy
the payments arrears should be an important factor in considering whether the country was making
reasonable efforts to redress its international financial situation.
3. IMF Articles of Agreement, art. I(v) (emphasis added).
4. Arrears to Creditors and Debt Strategy, Review of Fund Policies and Procedure on Payments Arrears Execu-
tive Board Meeting 80/154, Oct. 17, 1980, available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/sd/index.asp?deci-
sion=EBM/80/154.
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guidelines in these programs, the staff will continue to be guided by the approach set
forth in the Executive Board decision of 1970 (Decision No. 3153-(70/95)). This
approach will also be followed with respect to payments arrears arising from default.
The technique chosen by a member to reduce outstanding arrears will reflect its insti-
tutional arrangements, as well as the magnitude of the arrears and the severity of the
balance of payments problem. When payments arrears are large in relation to a
member's available foreign exchange resources, it may not be possible to aim at the
elimination of the arrears within the program period. Special arrangements may be
needed for the renegotiation of outstanding debt obligations when debt problems are
particularly severe. Depending on the member's circumstances and the length of the
program, it may not be possible, in the early stages of a program, to reach an under-
standing with the member that goes beyond requiring the avoidance of any further
increase in arrears. 5
The 1980 formulation, therefore, introduced two new elements. First, it expressly jet-
tisoned the strict requirement of the 1970 decision that all arrears must be cleared within
the period of a stand-by arrangement. Second, for the first time, the policy referred to the
possible need for "special arrangements" in severe cases that would eliminate the arrears
through the renegotiation of the member country's outstanding debts. Nothing in the
1980 formulation, however, sought to prescribe how those negotiations should be
conducted.
C. LIA IN THE GLOBAL DEBT CRISS OF THE 1980s
The global debt crisis that began in 1982, the infamous "lost decade" of Latin America,
profoundly reshaped both the role of the IMF, which was an institution in search of a
mission following the abandonment of the par value regime, and the design of some of the
LMF's policies, notably the LIA policy. The IMF played a key role in the sovereign debt
workouts of the 1980s, influencing the behavior of private creditors (which were, at that
point, almost exclusively commercial banks) as well as debtor governments.
During this period, the IMF's involvement in the sovereign debt restructuring process
sought to vindicate three principles that the Fund held dear. The first was the traditional
articles-mandated requirement to safeguard IMF resources. 6 Faced with a debt crisis of
potentially catastrophic dimensions, the risks to the IMF's own credit advances to the
twenty or twenty-five countries caught up in the process could no longer be viewed as
remote or speculative. A number of member countries had massively over-borrowed from
commercial banks in the late 1970s. Even the interest component of these loans became
unsustainable as U.S. dollar interest rates skyrocketed to more than 20 percent per annum
in the 1981-82 period. Without robust protections, therefore, fresh money advanced by
the IMF could easily have been swallowed up in partial interest payments to existing cred-
itors, leaving the IMF to join the queue of unhappy lenders holding defaulted loans.
5. Id. (emphasis added).
6. For a discussion of the policies developed by the Fund over the years to safeguard its own resources,
most notably with regard to its conditionality procedures, see Rosa Lastra, Legal Foundatios of International
Manetary Stability, 371-443 (Oxford University Press) (2006).
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Second, the IMF became a fierce advocate of "burden sharing," the idea that all of the
parties caught up in a sovereign debt crisis (the citizens of the debtor country, the credi-
tors, and the international financial institutions (IFI)) must share the pain of the resulting
workout in an equitable manner. Translated, this meant that the citizens had to accept an
IMF adjustment program, the creditors had to restructure their loans (which meant some-
times lending new money), and the IFI's had to continue emergency lending.
Finally, the IMF wanted to garner widespread recognition by governments and other
lenders of the IMF's "preferred creditor" status. 7 The IMF had long argued that it and
the other IFI's, unlike commercial lenders, were prepared to advance funds into visibly
distressed situations. This, the argument went, warranted an understanding that IFI cred-
itors would be completely exempt from default and restructuring.
The IMF was not sure that all sovereign debtors and all private creditors had bought
into this self-proclaimed "preferred creditor" status. After all, other types of lenders rang-
ing from trade creditors to bondholders had in their day tried to peddle their own theories
about why they should be exempted from sovereign debt restructurings. Had the IMF
been entirely confident that its preferred creditor status would be respected, there would
have been little need to worry about safeguarding IMF resources in a distressed situation
or, for that matter, little need for a policy on lending into arrears. The preferred creditor
status of IMF loans would ensure their timely repayment, regardless of the size of the
defaults and arrears inflicted on other creditors, all of whom would, in this scenario, have
accepted a de facto subordinated status.
In the early days of the global debt crisis, these factors induced the IMF to take a very
firm stance on lending into arrears. Notwithstanding the limited tolerance of arrears
found in the Board's pronouncements of 1970 and 1980, the IMF refused to lend money
under its stabilization programs during the 1980s unless and until the debtor country had
cleared its arrears with private creditors either through a rescheduling of overdue princi-
pal amounts or "new money" borrowings designed to refinance interest arrears, or both.
The practical effect of the IMF's policy of not lending to countries in payment arrears
to their private creditors meant, of course, that sovereign debtors needed to agree on the
terms of the restructuring offered by private creditors in order to access IMF resources.
The debtor's program of economic reform was thus effectively held hostage to the com-
mercial bank restructuring process." For their part, the commercial banks' willingness or
ability to negotiate these restructuring packages was heavily influenced by bank regulatory
and supervisory requirements. This was particularly important in the United States since
in order to continue to classify the loans as performing during the crisis, commercial
banks needed to receive interest payments on a timely basis. 9
By the end of the decade, the sovereign debt restructuring world had changed dramati-
cally. On March 10, 1989, U.S. Treasury Secretary Nicholas Brady announced what
would soon be dubbed the "Brady Initiative," a plan to induce commercial banks to write
off a portion of their claims against sovereign borrowers in return for receiving liquid,
7. See Lee Buchheit, Of Creditors, Preferred and Otherwise, INr'L FIN. L. Riv., June 1991, at 12.
8. See Anna Gelpern, Policy Briefs in International Economics, No. PB05-2, Institute for International Eco-
nomics, Sept. 2005, at 9.
9. See Sean Hagan, Sovereign Debtors, Private Creditors and the IMF, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY AND
FINANcIAL LAW UPON ENITFERING THE NEW MILLENNIUM, at 329 (Norton ed.); Lee Buchheit, Whatever
Became of Old New Money?, INT'L FIN. L. REv., Dec. 1990, at 11.
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partially-collateralized bonds for the balance. In addition, commercial bank debt restruc-
turing and new money packages became harder and harder to syndicate to the interna-
tional banking community as the 1980s moved on. Some smaller banks and some regional
banks flatly refused to participate in the later deals, dragging the restructuring process out
over months or years.' ° Finally, a few countries, Argentina and Brazil being the most
prominent, stopped paying interest on their commercial bank debt altogether. More pre-
cisely, they stopped borrowing "new money" from the bank lenders in order to remain
current on interest payments to those same lenders.I
A strict adherence to the IMF's "no arrears" policy, therefore, would have rendered the
IMF an increasingly irrelevant player in the sovereign debt workout process. If all IMF
programs had to await the conclusion of the sovereign debtor's latest restructuring/new
money package with its commercial creditors, there might soon be no IMF programs for
these countries at all.
D. THE REVOLUTION OF 1989
In May 1989, the IMF Executive Board concluded that its policy of not tolerating ar-
rears provided creditors with excessive leverage over the sovereign debtors caught up in
the debt crisis. As a result, the IMF again modified its arrears policy to tolerate temporary
arrears to commercial banks, enabling the IMF to support adjustment programs even if no
agreement had yet been reached between the debtor country and its bank creditors.' 2 The
Chairman's statement following the Executive Board meeting of May 23, 1989 (EBM/89/
61) (the "1989 Summing Up") said:
It is clearly the wish of the Board that the Fund discharge in full its central responsi-
bilities in the debt strategy, but without interference in negotiations between debtors and
creditors .... Directors agreed that there is a need for cautious adaptation of the Fund's
policy in light of the changed financial environment and the possibility that in some
cases significant time may be needed for banks and the members to agree on an ap-
propriate financing package. In such circumstances, the Fund would on a case-by case
basis, approve an arrangement outright before the conclusion of such negotiations,
provided that prompt Fund support is judged essential for program implementation, that
negotiations between the member and its bank creditors have begun, and that it can be ex-
pected that a financing package consistent with external viability will be agreed within a
reasonable period of time .... Progress in the negotiations with bank creditors would be
closely monitored .... Directors stressed that in promoting orderly financial relations,
every effort must be made to avoid arrears, which cannot be condoned or anticipated
by the Fund in the design of programs. Nevertheless, an accumulation of arrears to
banks may have to be tolerated where negotiations continue and the country's financing
10. See Lee Buchheit, "The Evolution of Debt Restructuring Techniques," INT'L FIN. L. REv., August
1992, at 10.
11. SeeJames M Boughton, The Silent Revolution. The International Monetary Fund 1979-1989, International
Monetary Fund (2001) Chapter 11 at 520-531, available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/history/2001/
chI l.pdf. The Appendix at the end of Chapter 11, entitled "Fund Policy on Financing Assurances and Ar-
rears," offers a summary of the LIA policy from 1970 to 1989.
12. See Arrears to Credit and Debt Strategy, The Chairman's Summing Up-Fund Involvement in Debt
Strategy Board meeting 89/61, available at www.imf.org/extemal/pubs/Ft/sd/index.asp?decision=EBM/89/61.
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situation does not allow them to be avoided. Directors emphasized that appropriate
safeguards would need to be incorporated into the monitoring procedures of the Fund
arrangement. The Fund's policy of non-toleration of arrears to official creditors remains
unchanged. The debtor member would be expected to continue to treat creditors on a non-
discriminatoy basis... 13
There are several important points to be gleaned from the 1989 Summing Up. First,
although the text strongly disavows any desire by the IMF to interfere with negotiations
between debtors and private sector creditors, the primary motivation of the 1989 shift in
LIA policy was to neutralize the ability of private creditors to use the IMF's "no arrears"
rule as negotiating leverage over sovereign debtors. As we shall discuss below, however,
the IMF's promise not to interfere in the debtor/creditor negotiation process proved to be
a fragile undertaking. Second, the 1989 Summing Up expressed no opinion about how the
debtor/creditor negotiations should be conducted; it only requires that such negotiations
shall have begun. This too would soon change. Third, although the IMF Board was pre-
pared to neutralize the negotiating advantage that its previous "no arrears" policy had
conveyed to private sector creditors, the 1989 Summing Up vigorously retained that ad-
vantage for official sector, primarily Paris Club, creditors: "The Fund's policy of non-
toleration of arrears to official creditors remains unchanged."14 It is worth noting that the
nineteen permanent members of the Paris Club represent, in aggregate, 60.67 percent of
the voting power in the Executive Board of the IMF.15
E. LIA IN SOVEREIGN BOND RESTRUCTURINGS
The decade that followed after 1989 witnessed even more dramatic changes in the com-
position of capital flows to emerging market economies. Bonds replaced syndicated bank
loans as the primary vehicle for financing emerging market sovereigns. Thousands of
disorganized bondholders replaced the highly organized commercial banks as the predom-
inant emerging market creditor class. All of this prompted yet another rethink of the LIA
policy.
1. The 1998 Formulation
In 1998, the IMF's Directors agreed that IMF support following a default on sovereign
bonds (an extension of the LIA policy) would be considered on a case-by-case basis but
only where: (i) prompt IMF support was considered essential for the successful implemen-
tation of the member's adjustment program, (ii) negotiations between the member and its
private creditors had begun, and (iii) there were firm indications that the sovereign bor-
rower and its private creditors would negotiate in good faith on a debt restructuring plan. 16
The first two criteria replicated those in the 1989 Summing Up while the third criterion,
good faith negotiations, was intended to address specific concerns relating to bond
restructuring.
13. Id. (emphasis added).
14. Id.
15. See Appendix.
16. Concluding Remarks by the Chairman on Involving the Private Sector in Forestalling and Resolving
Financial Crises, Buff/98/85 (9/14/98), at 5.
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The only contemporaneous justification for inserting this "good faith" qualification into
the requirement for debtor/creditor negotiations is found in the 1998 IMF staff report
that preceded the Executive Board meeting. 17 The staff there offered the view that: "To
help ensure that such a policy [lending into arrears on bonds] is not viewed by financial
markets as weakening members' obligations to their creditors, it would seem desirable for
the Fund to approve arrangements only when the sovereign was judged to be making a
good faith effort to regularize creditor relations."is In this single sentence of the 1998
staff report, one can mark the beginning of the confusion. The ordinary meaning of the
phrase "good faith effort" in this context would be "genuine" in the sense that the sover-
eign could not pretend to be negotiating with its creditors in order to access IMF re-
sources. "Good faith" does not prescribe how the negotiations would be conducted, for
example whether creditor committees would be recognized, nor does the phrase constrain
the nature of the bargain the sovereign might seek to drive. When the phrase "good
faith" entered the LIA discourse for the first time in 1998, it may thus have meant only
"not a pretext".
2. The 1999 Formulation
Further Executive Board discussions regarding the LIA policy took place in 1999,
shortly after the Asian debt crisis. 19 The Board concluded that bondholders, by simply
refusing to negotiate with a sovereign debtor, could effectively prevent the IMF from
assisting a member country. This prompted a 1999 revision of the policy.20 The simple
"good faith negotiation" criterion of the 1998 iteration of the policy was replaced by the
following formulation: "the member is... making a good faith effort to reach a collabora-
tive agreement with its creditors." 21
The shift in emphasis between the 1998 and 1999 versions is obvious. The focus in
1999, unlike all prior statements of the IMF's LIA policy, was on the nature of the result-
ing agreement with creditors ("collaborative"), not on the willingness of the sovereign to
enter into genuine (good faith) negotiations. And in this shift of emphasis, the IMF intro-
duced for the first time a motivation for the LIA policy that went beyond the traditional
"protect Fund resources" explanation. After all, if the sovereign debtor can reach a satis-
factory deal with its private creditors, who cares, from a "protect Fund resources" stand-
point, whether it was reached collaboratively or not? In other words, by 1999, the
Executive Board had decided that it had a legitimate interest in seeing that member coun-
tries dealt with their private creditors, and vice versa, according to someone's notion of fair
play.
17. See International Monetary Fund, "Fund Policy on Sovereign Arrears to Private Creditors," prepared
by the Policy Development and Review and Legal Departments (in consultation with other departments)
approved by Jack Boorman and Franqois Gianviti, January 9, 1998, SM/98/8.
18. Id. at 9, $ 70.
19. See EBS/99/67, Apr. 30, 1999, at 9.
20. The staff paper "Fund Policy on Arrears to Private Creditors - Further Considerations," prepared by
the Policy Department and Review and Legal Departments and approved by Jack Boorman and Franqois
Gianviti, April 29, 1999, was discussed by the Executive Board on June 14, 1999. See Summing Up by the
Acting Chairman, 99/64, available at http://www.imf.org/externalpubs/ft/privcredlending.pdf.
21. Id. at viii.
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3. The Backstory
The Executive Board's LIA deliberations during the period 1999-2002 were not occur-
ring in a vacuum. In 1999, three countries, Pakistan, Ukraine, and Ecuador -unable to
access the official sector bailouts that had kept countries like Mexico, Thailand, South
Korea, and Indonesia from having to restructure their bond indebtedness in the mid -to-
late 1990s-were forced to approach their bondholders with offers to exchange existing
bonds for new instruments that conveyed a measure of debt relief to the sovereign bor-
rower. These countries, however, approached the debt restructuring process very differ-
ently from their counterparts in the 1980s.
When commercial banks dominated the creditor class during the 1980s and early 1990s,
they established a formal negotiation process with the sovereign debtors. At the outset of
the process for any particular country, the banks would form a "Bank Advisory Committee
" (BAC) or "Steering Committee ," usually composed of the twelve to fourteen banks
having the largest exposures to that country. The Advisory Committees acted, although
they denied it at the time, as fully fledged negotiating committees. Once a deal was struck
with the committee, the sovereign could count on the BAC's influence to sell the deal to
the broader commercial banking community.
By 1999, commercial banks had ceded to bondholders their place as the dominant cred-
itors. When approaching the restructuring of bond indebtedness, a sovereign borrower
would typically appoint financial advisers or dealer managers who would informally con-
sult with representative bondholders in order to gauge the financial terms of a restructur-
ing that would find broad acceptance in the market. Following these consultations, the
terms of an exchange offer would be formulated by the sovereign, often in consultation
with the IMF, and the offer sent out to the holders of all eligible claims.
The crucial difference in the bond context is the absence of face-to-face negotiations
between the bondholders, or a committee purporting to represent the bondholders, and
the sovereign debtor. As some bondholders view things, however, any exchange offer that
has not been forged in the crucible of a negotiating room is, by definition, a "take it or
leave it" offer. These holders look back fondly on the golden era of BACs while perhaps
forgetting, through the rosy haze of that memory, just how dysfunctional some of the
BACs had become toward the end of the commercial bank debt restructuring process.
When the Executive Board of the IMF announced in 1998 that sovereign debtors wish-
ing to access IMF resources under the LIA policy should negotiate "in good faith" with
their private creditors, the bondholders thought they saw an opportunity to get back into
the game. If only the Executive Board could be persuaded to elaborate on the meaning of
a good faith negotiation, the bondholders reasoned, this would provide the leverage
needed to reestablish the Arcadian primacy of creditor committees in sovereign debt
restructurings.
The utility of creditor committees in sovereign debt workouts involving thousands of
disparate creditors is, of course, a complicated subject beyond the scope of this paper.
The significant point for these purposes is that the LIA policy, introduced in 1989 to
prevent private creditors from using IMF policies as leverage in their dealings with sover-
eign debtors, had (just over a decade later) been allowed to slip insensibly back into just
that position. The struggle over whether and to what degree the Executive Board
FALL 2007
948 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
prescribes the characteristics of a "good faith negotiation" needs to be understood in light
of this background. 22
4. The 2002 Formulation
On September 4, 2002, the Executive Board considered, once again, the good faith
criterion in the IMF's LIA policy 2 3 based upon a paper prepared by IMF staff24 in light of
the bond restructurings concluded by Ecuador, Pakistan and Ukraine.25 This time
around, the good faith criterion was elaborated into a full-blown set of prescriptions and
procedural rules for conducting negotiations with creditors. We quote from the 2002
Summing Up at length in order to give the reader some idea of just how much flesh had
been wrapped around the good faith bone. The 2002 Summing Up contained the follow-
ing precepts:
Directors considered that the following principles would strike an appropriate bal-
ance between clarity and flexibility in guiding the dialogue between debtors and their
private external creditors.
* First, when a member has reached a judgment that a restructuring of its debt is
necessary, it should engage in an early dialogue with its creditors, which should
continue until the restructuring is complete.
" Second, the member should share relevant, non-confidential information with
all creditors on a timely basis, which would normally include:
" an explanation of the economic problems and financial circumstances that jus-
tify a debt restructuring;
° a briefing on the broad outlines of a viable economic program to address the
underlying problems and its implications on the broad financial parameters
shaping the envelope of resources available for restructured claims; and
o the provision of a comprehensive picture of the proposed treatment of all
claims on the sovereign, including those of official bilateral creditors, and the
elaboration of the basis on which the debt restructuring would restore me-
22. Following the Asian debt crisis, the IMF also began considering the so-called Sovereign Debt Restruc-
turing Mechanism (SDRM), though the idea of an international bankruptcy procedure was also discussed in
the 1980s. See Anne Krueger, International Financial Architecture for 2002: A New Approach to Sovereign
Debt Restructuring, address at the National Economists' Club Annual Members' Dinner American Enter-
prise Institute, (Nov. 26, 2001), available at http://www.imf.org/extemal/np/speeches/2001/112601.htn. The
SDRM proposal went through several modifications in 2002 and 2003. See Anne Krueger, New Approaches
to Sovereign Debt Restructuring: An Update on Our Thinking, Conference on "Sovereign Debt Workouts:
Hopes and Hazards," Institute for International Economics (Apr. 1, 2002), at http://www.imf.org/extemal/
np/speeches/2002/040102.htm; see also PIN No. 03/45, Apr. 3, 2003, IMF Board Discusses Possible Features of a
Sovereign Debt Rest-uctring Mechanism, available at http://www.imf.org/extemal/np/sec/pn/2003/pn0345.
htm. However, the enthusiasm for the SDRM has waned since 2003, and reliance on market solutions (con-
tractual mechanisms) has become the preferred approach.
23. See Public Information Notice (PIN) No. 02/107, Sept. 24, 2002, http://www.imf.org/extemal/np/sec/
pn/2002/pn02107.htm#P40_2845.
24. See International Monetary Fund, "Fund Policy on Lending into Arrears to Private Creditors-Further
Consideration of the Good Faith Criterion," prepared by the International Capital Markets, Policy Develop-
ment and Review and Legal Departments (in consultation with the other Departments), approved by Gerd
Hlusler, Timothy Geithner, and Frangois Gianviti, SM/02/248, July 30, 2002, available at http://www.imf.
org/extemal/pubs/ft/privcred/073002.htm.
25. Id.
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dium-term sustainability, bearing in mind that not all categories of claims may
need to be restructured.
o Third, the member should provide creditors with an early opportunity to give
input on the design of restructuring strategies and the design of individual
instruments.
" Although, as a general premise, the form of the dialogue would be left to the
debtor and its creditors, under this approach a member in arrears would be ex-
pected to initiate a dialogue with its creditors prior to agreeing on a Fund-sup-
ported program consistent with the principles discussed above. In cases in which
an organized negotiating framework is warranted by the complexity of the case
and by the fact that creditors have been able to form a representative committee
on a timely basis, there would be an expectation that the member would enter
into good faith negotiations with this committee, though the unique characteris-
tics of each case would also be considered. This formal negotiating framework
would include, inter alia, the sharing of confidential information needed to en-
able creditors to make informed decisions on the terms of a restructuring (sub-
ject to adequate safeguards), and the agreement to a standstill on litigation
during the restructuring process by creditors represented in the committee. By
the same token, in less complex cases, where creditors have not organized a rep-
resentative committee within a reasonable period, or where for other reasons a
formal negotiation framework would not be effective, the member would be ex-
pected to engage creditors through a less structured dialogue. Directors stressed
that, in going forward with the suggested approach, it would be crucial to strike
the appropriate balance between the need to promote effective communication
between a debtor and its creditors, and the need to retain flexibility to address
the diversity of individual country circumstances...
* Directors emphasized that it would be inappropriate for private creditors to be
given a veto over the design of the financing plan or the design of the adjustment
program. 26
This was a dangerous path on which to embark. As with all attempts to define the
correct deportment of human beings, one either stays at the level of Sermon on the
Mount generality (in this case, the 1999 encouragement of a "collaborative" process), or
one descends into detailed behavioral prescriptions (such as the Board's 2002 essay at
defining the operation of a suitable creditor committee). Similar exercises have been un-
dertaken in other fields, usually with comparable results. The Hays Code,2 7 promulgated
in the Hollywood of the 1930s, for example, started off at the splendidly Olympian level of
requiring the production of motion pictures that present the "correct standards of life."
The Code soon refined this, however, into a series of highly specific admonitions, such as
forbidding film portrayals of "excessive and lustful kissing." (On balance, it seems likely
that being a member of the Hays Committee was more entertaining than being a member
of the Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund.)
26. See PIN, supra note 23 (emphasis added).
27. Motion Picture Production Code of 1930, Hays Code, available at http://www.artsreformation.com/
a001/hays-code.html.
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I11. Muddled Objectives
As the previous discussion shows, at various times and in various ways, the IMF has
signaled that the LIA policy serves one or both of the following objectives: (i) to safeguard
IMF resources and (ii) to act as referee in a sovereign debtor's relationship with its private
creditors.
A. SAFEGUARD IMF RESOURCES
The IMF is only called upon to provide financial assistance to member countries when
something has gone wrong. That's the business the IMF is in-a lender of last resort
when access to normal sources of finance have been shut off.
Lending into a distressed situation calls for special vigilance on the part of the creditor.
There will undoubtedly be other creditors lurking about, usually unpaid, sore and twitchy.
Unless the new lender is careful, it will just pour good money into a leaky financial struc-
ture and thereby join the ranks of the unpaid, the sore, and the twitchy. In corporate
bankruptcy systems, there are rules that give a priority to lenders that advance funds after
the company has filed for bankruptcy, but these rules are obviously not applicable to sov-
ereign debtors.2 8
So, there is nothing unusual about the IMF's desire to ensure that a member country
resolve or neutralize the threat posed by unsatisfied existing creditors before the IMF
advances its own money. The LIA policy announced in 1989 represented a limited excep-
tion to this perfectly understandable concern. The 1989 iteration of LIA, however, was
expressly result-oriented, not process-oriented. The IMF would consider lending, as
stated by the 1989 Summing Up, provided "that negotiations between the member coun-
try and its bank creditors have begun, and that it can be expected that a financing package
consistent with external viability will be agreed within a reasonably period of time." Note
the absence of any adjectives qualifying the word "negotiations."
That said, safeguarding the IMF's resources cannot be the sole motivation for the LIA
policy as it is currently implemented. The evidence?
" A new lender into a distressed situation will be concerned with whether the threat
posed by existing creditors has been neutralized, not by how it has been neutralized.
" Indeed, a new lender behaving rationally will openly applaud a debtor that drives a
hard bargain with its existing lenders-the harder the better. The less money that
the debtor owes to the universe of existing creditors, the better the chances that the
new lender will be able to recover its loans.
" Existing claims that are barred from legal enforcement by a statute of limitations or
other legal defense should not worry a new lender.
" A small stub of unresolved residual claims whose aggregate amount is immaterial to
the financial position of the borrower should also not trouble a new lender moti-
vated exclusively by a desire to "safeguard its own resources." Even if all of those
stub claims were paid in full, it would not jeopardize the borrower's financial abil-
ity to pay the new lender.
28. IMF conditionality operates in part as a substitute for collateral in lending to sovereign borrowers. See
Lastra, supra note 6, at 417.
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History shows, however, the IMF does worry about all of these things. The TMF visibly
winces when a member country seeks debt relief from its existing creditors in excess of
that contemplated by the IMF's own program. The IMF entertains the complaints of
private creditors who feel that they have been roughly handled in the debt restructuring
process. And, as part of a "no creditor left behind" philosophy, the IMF's solicitude ex-
tends even to existing creditors whose claims are no longer legally enforceable or that are,
in aggregate, of only a negligible size. The modern IMF shepherd thus purports to guard
the entire flock of private creditors, including the small, the powerless and the
disorganized.
This suggests that another motivation, apart from or in addition to the desire to safe-
guard IMF resources, is therefore at work. That motivation appears to be a desire to act
as a referee in the process of sovereign debt restructuring with private creditors.
B. REFEREE
Since the LIA policy was first introduced in 1989, it has evolved in a manner that shows
a much greater concern for how a sovereign debtor reaches its settlement with its private
creditors, not just whether such a settlement has been concluded. What explains this
growing concern about the process by which the sovereign debtor reaches a settlement?
In 1989, the IMF probably believed that commercial bank advisory committees were fully
capable of holding their own in negotiations with their sovereign borrowers. 29 Disparate,
disorganized, occasionally unsophisticated bondholders, however, may be a different mat-
ter. Perhaps the Board has now concluded that bondholders require a champion, a pala-
din to ensure that they are not stampeded into a disadvantageous deal with a sovereign
debtor.
If indeed the IMF has now decided, through the medium of its lending into arrears
policy, to referee the negotiations between sovereign debtors and their bondholder credi-
tors (something that the 1989 Summing Up expressly declared should never happen), the
Fund will have to confront several uncomfortable facts.
" The IMF staff never, ever enters a sovereign debt restructuring negotiating room
with private creditors. (They are present, however, in all Paris Club negotiations.)
The staff has repeatedly warned the Board that it fears the IMF could be accused of
tortious interference with contractual relationships were it openly to take a posi-
tion on matters, such as whether the sovereign should stay in default on its bonds,
likely to be discussed in such a room. 30
" The IMF can apply sanctions to a sovereign debtor that it finds has breached the
requirement of fair play (the IMF refuses to lend into that country's arrears), but it
has no ready sanctions to punish uncooperative private creditors. Here again, the
Fund has had a consistent record of staying out of harm's way, even at the'cost of
leaving a member country without a useful ally in a litigation.
" Before a sovereign debtor ever enters a negotiating room with its private creditors,
the IMF's program will have defined the "payments envelope" that will constrain
how much the sovereign can pay in debt service to those creditors over the medium
29. And they were. See Lee Buchheit, Advisory Committees; What's in a Name?, INrI'L. FIN. L. REV., Jan.
1991, at 9.
30. See International Monetary Fund, supra note 17, at 32, T 62.
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term. 31 It is astonishing that some of the bondholders who clamor most loudly for
Fund assistance in forcing the sovereign into a "good faith" negotiation do not
appreciate that the IMF itself will have preordained the financial outcome of that
very negotiation in its stabilization program (although the debtor and its creditors
will be left to agree on the method by which this aggregate financial outcome will
be achieved). 3 2 It is like telling the candy shop owner that Johnny has free license
to buy anything he wants in the shop without adding that Johnny's weekly allow-
ance is now fixed at 75 cents.
In short, in its role as a self-appointed referee in negotiations between sovereign debtors
and their bondholders, the IMF suffers from these disabilities: This referee never actually
enters the arena; it relies for information on how the game is going based on verbal re-
ports by the two contestants. This referee can sanction only one of the teams. Finally,
this referee has, well before the game has begun, already decided the final score.
V. Conclusion
The IMF's lending into arrears policy has drifted a long way from its original moorings.
The critical turning point in the evolution of the LIA policy occurred in 1998-99, when
the IMF for the first time expressed a concern about how a sovereign debtor deals with its
private sector creditors and not simply whether it has done so. Once subjective criteria
like "good faith" and "collaborative" negotiations were allowed to enter the picture, they
inevitably became a magnet for lobbying by creditors and industry groups that perceived
an opportunity to obtain higher financial recoveries through face-to-face negotiations, as
31. The 2002 Sumning Up makes it clear that the IMF will brook no interference in its role as the sole
arbiter of the payments envelope:
[Directors] also noted that to the extent that negotiations become stalled because creditors are
requesting terms that are inconsistent with the adjustment and financing parameter that have
been established under a Fund-supported program, the Fund should retain the flexibility to con-
tinue to support member notwithstanding the lack of progress in negotiations with creditors. In
this connection, it was stressed that decisions on an adequate macroeconomic framework that
could form the basis for the Fund's lending into arrears will remain in the sole purview of the
Fund .... Directors emphasized that it would be inappropriate for private creditors to be given a
veto over the design of the financing plan or the design of the adjustment program.
PIN, sipra note 23.
32. This feature of the current sovereign debt restructuring process is, for obvious reasons, rarely men-
tioned in public. One notable exception is the following reference in a speech given by Timothy D. Adams,
U.S. Department of the Treasury, on September 23, 2005 to a conference on IMF Reform at the Institute for
International Economics:
There has been considerable discussion about whether the IMF should set the "resource envel-
ope" or debt restructuring through the primary fiscal surplus in a Fund program. It is helpful for
a country and the LMF to reach agreement on the primary surplus. This greatly facilitates a
subsequent determination of whether the country is making a good faith effort to resolve its
defaulted debt to private creditors-a precondition for the IMF to lend.
http://www.iie.com/publications/print.cfm?doc=pub&ResearchlD=564.
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opposed to being the passive recipients of exchange offers formulated by the sovereign
debtors.33
In matters involving hundreds of millions, often billions, of dollars, a vague and subjec-
tive test of fair play would inevitably cry out for further elaboration. The Executive Board
succumbed to the temptation to elaborate on its understanding of a good faith/collabora-
tive negotiation in 2002. Unless it consciously arrests the process, the Board will presum-
ably be drawn into further elaborations, clarifications and glosses in the future.
The irony, of course, is that the Executive Board relaxed its "no arrears" policy in 1989
precisely because it saw that private creditors were using the policy as leverage in their
negotiation with sovereign borrowers. Then, roughly a decade later, it slipped back into
that same uncomfortable position by giving private creditors a new kind of leverage-the
threat that they will lobby the IMF to withhold funds because of the sovereign's alleged
bad faith approach to resolving private sector claims.
The important point, however, is that the presence or absence of collaborative negotia-
tions has nothing to do with safeguarding the IMF's own resources or achieving an or-
derly balance of payments adjustment for the member country. The IMF, perhaps for the
most noble of reasons, is now taking on a role as the arbiter of correct behavior in sover-
eign debt workouts. No doubt the justification is that the overall health of the financial
system is injured when rogue debtors or rogue creditors violate these norms of good be-
havior, but the jurisdictional question is where, in the Fund's Articles of Agreement, have
the member countries given this responsibility to the IMF?
For the last few years, we have lived through a fairly benign economic period in which
there have been relatively few sovereign debt restructurings. But were a more systemic
crisis to occur, the Executive Board of the IMF could easily finding itself sitting as a quasi-
judicial body, reaching moral judgments about the conduct of member countries in their
dealings with private creditors. A small jurisprudence could develop about what is, and is
not, permissible in the eyes of the Board. Precedents will be cited. Articles will be written
on this jurisprudence. Conferences organized. Lectures prepared and delivered.
If the Executive Board wishes to alter course in the LIA policy, we can see at least three
alternatives:
Option One: Return to Basics
The Executive Board could reverse its recent drift toward assuming a referee function
in sovereign debt workouts and return to the original goal of implementing an LIA policy
that focuses only on achieving adequate safeguards for protecting IMF resources. This
would produce an LIA policy along these lines:
33. See Krishna Guha, Finance lobby warns of risks to global growth, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 5, 2007, at 7, reporting
on an open letter from the Managing Director of the Institute for International Finance ("11F") to the Chair-
man of the IMF's Governing Council:
[The IM] also called on the IMF to do more to support a set of voluntary principles for relations
between sovereign borrowers and lenders which the HF developed. . .[The IIM added that a
possible redrafting of IMF rules on lending into arrears raised concerns that the policy could be
diluted further, weakening creditor rights.
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Directors will countenance lending to a member that has accumulated arrears to pri-
vate sector lenders, but only if the Board has concluded that the member is embarked
on a program that stands as a high chance of clearing those arrears within a reasona-
ble period of time to the point that any residual (unresolved) claims do not pose a
threat to the member's repayment of the Fund's advances or its achievement of an
orderly balance of payments adjustment. Subsequent purchases under the Fund's
program may be conditional on satisfactory progress of the member toward this goal.
Option Two: Back to Basics, but with Avuncular Advice
This alternative tracks Option One, except that the Executive Board may, in separate
pronouncements, volunteer its views about what practices work best in sovereign debt
restructurings. We now have sufficient examples of sovereign bond restructurings to ex-
trapolate some general lessons about which techniques tend to facilitate, and which to
retard, these operations. To be clear, the Board's pronouncements about its views of best
practices would, under Option Two, not be prescriptive or binding on member countries.
They would rather be advisory, perhaps hortatory, in nature.
Option Three: Candid and Symmetrical LIA
Under this Option, the Board would openly embrace a role as the arbiter of acceptable
practices in workouts of sovereign debts owed to private creditors. But the Board would
crack the whip on the backs of both debtors and creditors alike. The resulting LIA policy
might read something like this:
* Directors have approved the attached Statement of Best Practices in the restructur-
ing of member country debts owed to private creditors.
* Any member country that deviates (without Board approval) from these Best Prac-
tices will be deemed not to have acted in good faith in its dealings with its private
creditors, and the Board will not approve a program for that country until private
sector arrears have been cleared.
" If, however, a member county follows these Best Practices and makes a restructur-
ing proposal to its private sector creditors containing financial terms that are con-
sistent with the Fund's stabilization program for that country, any private sector
creditor declining such a proposal will be deemed by the Board not to have acted in
good faith in its dealings with the member country.
• Under these circumstances, the Fund will reserve the right to assist the member
country in defending against any effort by such a creditor to seek a preferential
monetary recovery from the member country including, if the Board thinks appro-
priate, appearing as an interested party in any litigation commenced by such a
creditor against the member.
Naturally, some observers will see in Option Three a backdoor return to the objectives
of the IMF's proposed Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism. But if the IMF really
wishes to referee these matches, Option Three at least embraces the virtues of candor and
symmetry.
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APPENDIX
IMF Voting Rights of Paris Club Members34
IMF QUOTA
(Millions of IMF QUOTA VOTE IN
MEMBER SDRs) (Percent of Total) PERCENTAGE
Australia 3,236.4 1.49 1.48
Austria 1,872.3 0.86 0.86
Belgium 4,605.2 2.12 2.10
Canada 6,369.2 2.94 2.89
Denmark 1,642.8 0.76 0.76
Finland 1,263.8 0.58 0.58
France 10,738.5 4.95 4.87
Germany 13,008.2 6.00 5.90
Ireland 838.4 0.39 0.39
Italy 7,055.5 3.26 3.21
Japan 13,312.8 6.14 6.04
Netherlands 5,162.4 2.38 2.35
Norway 1,671.7 0.77 0.77
Russian Federation 5,945.4 2.74 2.70
Spain 3,048.9 1.41 1.39
Sweden 2,395.5 1.11 1.10
Switzerland 3,458.5 1.60 1.58
United Kingdom 10,738.5 4.95 4.87
United States of America 37,149.3 17.14 16.83
TOTAL 133,513.3 61.59% 60.67%
34. See International Monetary Fund, IMF Members' Quotes and Voting Power, and L\F Board of
Governors, July 12, 2007, available at http://www.iinf.org/external/np/sec/memdir/members.htn.
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